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Cultural Proximity and Trade
Abstract
Cultural proximity increases bilateral trade flows through a trade-cost and
a bilateral-affinity (preferences) channel. Conventional measures of cultural
proximity, such as common language, common religion, etc., do not allow to
separately quantify those channels empirically. We argue that quality-adjusted
Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) scores can be used as dyadic, time-variant in-
formation on European countries’ cultural proximity. Assuming that the trade-
cost related component of cultural proximity is time-invariant, in a gravity
model of bilateral trade, the time dimension of the ESC data allows to iden-
tify the preferences effect. The validity of our identification strategy can be
tested by exploiting the lack of systematic reciprocity in ESC scores. While
we find robust evidence for a sizable preferences effect, the impact of cultural
proximity on trade runs largely through the cost effect.
Keywords: International Trade, Gravity Equation, Cultural Prox-
imity, Identification.
JEL classification: F12, F15, Z10
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical literature suggests that cultural proximity is a major deter-
minant of bilateral trade flows. 1 This finding is robust to the exact definition
of cultural proximity which researchers usually try to capture by measures
such as linguistic proximity, colonial linkages, ethnic or even biological simi-
larity, and constructed variables, for example Hopensted’s measures of cultural
proximity; see Linders et al. (2005) for a recent survey and references.
Fundamentally, there are two channels through which cultural proximity in-
fluences bilateral trade. First, cultural proximity lowers direct and indirect
trade costs. For instance, the existence of a common language directly lowers
trade costs as it makes expensive translation services redundant. There may
also be an indirect effect on trade costs when common language encourages
the formation of business networks which in turn tend to increase bilateral
trade volumes; see Rauch and Trindade (2004) and Casella and Rauch (2003).
Second, cultural proximity may be reflected in the preferences of consumers
in one country for the varieties produced in another country, thereby directly
enhancing the volume of bilateral trade.
This paper tries to measure the empirical importance of the channels through
which cultural proximity affects bilateral trade flows. From a normative point
of view, disentangling the trade cost channel from the preferences mechanism
is an important task since only trade creation based on a reduction in trade
costs can be straightforwardly associated to welfare gains. To the best of our
knowledge we are the first to propose an empirical decomposition strategy in
the context of cultural proximity. However, the problem of separately identi-
fying preferences and costs effects is not new in the empirical trade literature.
In a very interesting paper, Combes et al. (2005) use data on migration and
trade between French De´partements to highlight the importance of ethnic net-
1 For recent contributions to this debate see the papers by Boisso and Ferrantino
(1997), Frankel (1997), or Disdier and Mayer (2005), to cite only a few.
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works. They show that migrants convey non-price information between two
distant locations and thus facilitate trade by bridging information gaps be-
tween their home country and their host region. A stock of migrants from
some source country therefore lowers trade costs, but it may also affect trade
volumes as migrants continue to consume goods produced in their home coun-
tries. Combes et al. recognize this issues, but do not offer a way to distinguish
both channels.
This paper uses an original database, which provides time-varying information
on bilateral cultural proximity between countries. The data are taken from
the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC): a yearly competition involving a growing
number of European and non-European countries since 1956. Each country
is represented by a single artist or a group. Voters in each country grade the
other participating countries by according points to that country’s artist(s).
Controlling for the quality of the song, these grades robustly correlate with
standard measures of cultural proximity discussed above. This fact implies
that the ESC scores can be used as a proxy of cultural proximity.
Conventional cultural proximity variables are time-invariant and symmetric
in that they take the same value irrespective of the direction of the trade rela-
tion to be analyzed. In contrast, the ESC scores are dyadic, time-varying, and
potentially asymmetric. 2 Our identifying assumption is that the components
of cultural proximity related to the trade costs channel are constant over time
while the components related to the preference mechanism are not. The latter
change according to fashions and fads, political problems between two coun-
tries, or simply idiosyncratic shocks. Standard cultural proximity measures
matter for preferences, too, but the time varying nature of the Eurovision data
allows to separately identify the preferences channel of cultural proximity. We
check the validity of our identifying strategy by exploiting another property
of ESC scores: their relative lack of reciprocity. Not only is the cost-channel of
2These features are nicely in line with the theoretical definition of cultural proximity
as employed by sociologists, see below.
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cultural proximity largely time-invariant, it is also necessarily symmetric and
should therefore foster imports and exports between two countries similarly.
The time-varying component of the ESC grades, however, reflects the popu-
larity of the graded country in some grader country. It should be correlated
to exports of the graded country but need not be correlated to imports from
the grader country.
Note that the ESC database has been used a few times in academic research
before, albeit not in empirical analyzes of bilateral trade flows. Ginsburgh
and Noury (2005) use the data to test whether voting in the song contest
involves vote trading (logrolling). Haan et al. (2005) exploit the transition of
the grading process from jury-based voting to generalized televoting in order
to address the question on how expert judgment compares to public opinion.
Fenn et al.(2006) run a cluster analysis on the ESC database to identify clubs
of European countries. They find evidence for unofficial cliques of countries.
Clerides and Stengos (2006) come to a similar conclusion, and stress that
cultural proximity is a good predictor for countries’ voting behavior.
We construct a simple theoretical trade and geography model in the spirit
of Redding and Venables (2004) and Combes et al. (2005). Our theoretical
framework explicitly models the effect of cultural proximity on trade costs
and a bilateral affinity parameter that appears in the utility function. We
follow the established practice and apply fixed-effects estimation techniques
to investigate the impact of a quality-adjusted ESC score on the value of
bilateral trade between European countries. 3
We arrive at the following empirical results. First, conventional measures of
cultural proximity explain a significant share of the variance in our European
bilateral trade data. Second, quality-adjusted ESC scores correlate robustly
with those measures and can therefore be interpreted as proxies of cultural
3 See Hummels (1999), Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), Feenstra (2004) and
Redding and Venables (2004) for recent examples of this strategy.
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proximity themselves. Third, including country-pair fixed effects to take out
all time-invariant variance from the data, we find that country j’s quality-
adjusted ESC scores for country i still matter for the volume of exports from
country i to country j in a statistically and economically significant way.
In line with our identification strategy, imports from country j to country
i are affected to a much smaller degree and with lower levels of statistical
significance. Our main results survive a number of robustness checks that
deal with the validity of our identification strategy and the time-consistency
of the ESC data. We conclude that cultural proximity affects bilateral trade
flows mainly through the cost channel. However, there is robust evidence for
a sizable preferences effects, too.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a theoretical framework
and discusses our identification strategy. Section 3 provides a thorough dis-
cussion of the data and introduces the econometric model. Section 4 presents
our main results and robustness checks, while section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework and estimation strategy
2.1 The standard “new trade theory” model
We base our theoretical model on the conventional multi-country monopolis-
tic competition model of trade, surveyed, e.g., by Feenstra (2004). The only
modification to the standard case comes through the appearance of a bilateral
affinity parameter which may differ across country pairs. Consumers are as-
sumed to love variety. They choose from a bundle of different varieties, which
are symmetric within each country but asymmetric between countries. The
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) is the same for any two varieties
within the same location but differs between varieties coming from different
locations. In the aggregate, consumers’s decisions are reflected in those of the
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representative consumer who buys an average amount of each variety depend-
ing on its price. The corresponding utility function is defined as follows:
Ujt =
(
C∑
i=1
a
σ−1
σ
ijt
∫
nit
xjit(z)
σ−1
σ dz
) σ
σ−1
, σ > 1. (1)
The term xjit (z) denotes the quantity of a variety z originating from country
i and consumed in country j at time t. nit is the number of varieties offered
in country i, and C is the number of countries.
As in Combes et al. (2005), we assume that a specific weight, aijt, is attached
to all varieties imported from region i. This weight describes the affinity of
consumers from country j for country i. Constraining aijt < ajjt, we would
introduce home market bias; moreover, by writing aijt = aikt for all k 6= j
we would model objectively measurable quality differences between different
source countries. For our purposes, we let aijt completely unrestricted. Note,
however, that we assume that the weights aijt are country-specific; that is,
they apply similarly to all varieties z produced by country j.
All imported varieties from some country i enter symmetrically into the re-
spective sub-utility index. Assuming that all varieties from the same origin
bear the same mill price pit (reflecting symmetric production technologies),
and that iceberg ad valorem trade costs 1 + τjit do not depend on character-
istics of the varieties, the quantity, xjit is identical for all z. This allows to
derive country j′s demand function for varieties imported from country j
xjit = a
σ−1
ijt
(
pjit
Pjt
)−σ
Ejt
Pjt
, (2)
where Pjt is the ideal price index dual to equation (1)
Pjt =
∑
i
(
aijt
pjit
)σ−1
nit
 11−σ , (3)
andEjt is total expenditure of country j, expressed in terms of some nume´raire.
Hence, total demand for varieties originating from country i is larger, the
stronger country j′s preferences for country i′s products (aijt), the smaller the
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relative price of products from country i (pjit/Pjt), and the larger country j
′s
real income (Ejt/Pjt). Note that a higher preference for country i
′s products
reduces the price index in the same way as a reduction in the price of imports
from country i.
Equation (2) describes the volume of country j’s imports for any variety pro-
duced in country i. Its aggregate value gives total imports from i to j, i.e.,
country i’s total exports to country j.
Xijt = nitpijtxijt = a
σ−1
jit (1 + τijt)
1−σnitp1−σit EjtP
σ−1
jt . (4)
The right-hand side of this equation contains both demand and supply char-
acteristics. We define φjt ≡ EjtP σ−1jt as country j′s market capacity and
φit ≡ nitp1−σit as the supply capacity of the exporting country, i. All this
allows the trade equation to be rewritten as:
Xijt = a
σ−1
jit (1 + τijt)
1−σ φitφjt. (5)
2.2 Modeling cultural proximity
Cultural proximity affects the bilateral trade equation (5) in two ways. First,
it lowers direct trade costs, 1 + τijt. For example, information costs are lower
when partners share the same language. By the same token, legal contracting
costs are lower when buyers and sellers in different locations operate in similar
jurisdictional and institutional frameworks. Moreover, cultural proximity indi-
rectly affects trade costs as it facilitates the formation of business and/or social
networks. In turn, these networks help to overcome informational trade barri-
ers, associated to contract enforcement. Of course linguistic and jurisdictional
similarity also helps with developing and maintaining business contacts, but
network formation is fostered by a wider array of factors including common
values or religion, a common past, ethnic links, etc.
The second channel through which cultural proximity influences bilateral trade
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affects consumers’ preferences via the bilateral affinity parameter ajit. A high
value of ajit means that the representative consumer in country j puts a high
value on products produced in country i. Together with the assumption σ > 1,
this leads to higher trade volumes.
We decompose country j′s cultural proximity to country i (Πjit) into a sym-
metric, time-invariant part p¯iji and an asymmetric, time-variant part pijit, pos-
tulating a multiplicative form Πjit = p¯ijipijit. The key identifying assumption
in this paper comes in two parts: (i) the trade cost channel of cultural prox-
imity on trade operates only through the time-invariant component p¯iji while
(ii) the bilateral affinity term ajit is driven by both, the time invariant and
the time variant components.
That decomposition is motivated by the definition of cultural proximity as so-
ciologists use it. For instance, according to Straubhaar (2002), cultural prox-
imity goes “beyond language to include history, religion, ethnicity (in some
cases) and culture in several senses”. It relates to closeness in terms of “iden-
tity, gestures and nonverbal communication; what is considered funny or se-
rious or even sacred; clothing styles; living patterns; climate influences and
other relationships with the environment.” It is clear that this definition refers
both to time-invariant (language, religion, ethnicity) and time-variant (cloth-
ing styles, living patterns, etc.) components of cultural proximity. The defin-
ition implicit in the measures used in economic applications focuses only on
the time-invariant part, since the time-variant one is difficult to observe.
Assumption (i) is motivated by the fact that those components of cultural
proximity that matter for trade cost, e.g., linguistic, religious, legal, or ethnic
proximity, are both largely time-invariant and symmetric in nature. It is true
that even the cost-relevant component of cultural proximity evolves over very
long time horizons, for example due to invasions, mass migration, or due to the
emergence of a single global cultural pattern. However, the time span analyzed
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in our paper is very short (29 years) compared to these secular dimensions. 4
The assumption that p¯iji is symmetric, i.e., p¯iji = p¯iij for all i and j, is trivially
justified by the nature of trade cost-relevant cultural proximity.
Assumption (ii) implies that both, time-variant and time-invariant compo-
nents of cultural proximity, i.e., pijit, affect trade through the bilateral affinity
term ajit. The term pijit may (but need not) be asymmetric. Our assumptions
mean that the time-invariant components discussed above may matter for the
preference channel, but that a large array of time-variant factors matter, too.
For example, Italy and Italian products may be popular in Finland, the ab-
sence of a common language, common values and ethnic ties notwithstanding.
Italy may be appealing to Finns because of its cultural, intellectual or political
achievements. While the definition cited above understands bilateral affinity
as just another dimension of cultural proximity, there is nothing that precludes
the preference effect from changing over time or from being asymmetric across
two countries. It is conceivable, that Finns feel culturally close to Italy, but
that feeling need not be reciprocal.
Having said this, we plug the term p¯iji into a conventional trade cost function,
with the state of technology and geographical distance as additional argu-
ments. Hence, we posit 1 + τijt = A0e
gtDδijp¯i
β1
ji e
Kijtεijt, where A0e
gt measures
the state of technology, reflecting advances in transport or communication
technologies, while Dij is geographical distance. The term e
Kijt is meant to
capture the stance of trade policy, with a low value of Kijt indicating a low
degree of policy-induced trade restrictiveness. Our key identifying assumption
is that the trade costs channel of cultural proximity is related to variables that
do not change over time, at least not over the time span under investigation
in the present study. The parameter β1 is expected to be negative, while δ is
positive; εijt is an idiosyncratic disturbance.
In turn, the bilateral affinity parameter ajit depends on both components of
4We come back to this point in our robustness checks.
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cultural proximity. Hence, we write ajit = Π
β2
jitijt, where ijt is an idiosyncratic
error term. Plugging the specification of trade costs and the bilateral affinity
parameter into equation (5), we derive our base-line specification:
Xijt =
(
(A0e
gtDδijp¯i
β1
ji εijt)
)1−σ
(Πβ2jitijt)
σ−1φitφjt. (6)
This equation links the exports of country i to country j to the market and
supply capacity measures φj and φi, the trade costs, τij, and the bilateral
affinity between countries, ajit.
3 Data and empirical strategy
In this subsection, we first provide some evidence on the time variation and
degree of reciprocity of the ESC data, and then argue that ESC scores can
be interpreted as measures of cultural proximity. Moreover, we provide the
sample statistics for our regressions and characterize our econometric model.
3.1 Eurovision Song Contest score data
The Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) was founded in 1955 by European broad-
casting stations represented in the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), and
held for the first time in Lugano, Switzerland, in 1956, with seven countries
competing. The number of participants has increased steadily since then and
also includes two regular non-European participants: Israel and Turkey. The
only formal restriction is that the television station that broadcasts the show
(the previous year’s winning country) has to be member of the EBU. Since
2002, there are 24 slots for finalists, of which four are reserved for Germany,
France, Spain and the United Kingdom. Other countries are guaranteed a slot
every other year. Each ESC is broadcast by television, and since 1985, this
happens via satellite. In 2001, the contest was held in front of an audience
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of 38,000 in Copenhagen, and broadcast live all around the world. Usually,
several hundred millions of people watch the show every year.
The scoring system changed several times. Since 1975–the first year in our
dataset, the 11 (16 between 1988 and 1997) jury members in each country
(often a popular jury, not consisting of experts), can rate on a scale from 1 to
10. Televoting was introduced in 1998, 5 so that every citizen can participate,
and according to Haan, Dijkstra and Dijkstra (2005), “in many countries,
the number of people calling into register their vote is in the hundreds of
thousands.”
The ratings are normalized so that the favorite song gets 12 points, the next
one 10, and then 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1. This allows each voting country
to give positive ratings to ten other countries. Participating countries cannot
vote for their nationals. The order in which candidates perform is randomly
drawn before the competition starts. After the performance, countries are
asked to cast their votes. Results are announced country by country, in the
same order in which participants have performed. Finally, participants are
ranked according to their aggregate score.
In order to investigate the degree of reciprocity in ESC grading behavior,
we compare country j’s grades for country i’s song (scoreij) with the grades
that country i has for country j (scoreji). Focusing on the time span 1975-
2003 that we use later on, we can compute the Spearman rank correlation
coefficient between scoreij and scoreji. This coefficient is 0.0811, which is
significantly different from zero at any conventional level of significance. Hence,
there is evidence for reciprocity, but this evidence is weak in the sense that the
correlation coefficient is very low. Since every year the song contest succeeds in
dressing at least a partial ranking of songs, lack of reciprocitgy is a necessary
feature of the data. Perfect reciprocity would lead to ties at the first and the
5Our data spans the period 1975-2004; hence, we carry out robustness checks re-
lated to the introduction of televoting.
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last place of the ranking. But even after controlling for this fact, the degree of
reciprocity is low on average and high only in special subsamples of our data,
e.g., in the subsample of Nordic or Mediterranean countries.
We conduct the following exercise to substantiate this claim. We denote µit
the average score that country i has received in year t from the other ESC
competitors. We regress scoreij on µit and a comprehensive set of country-pair
specific intercepts. These intercepts measure how country j’s judgment on i’s
song deviates from the average score that i received over the years. Hence, we
interpret the intercepts as excess-scores, i.e., evidence of excessive friendliness
(or lack of it) of a country vis-a-vis of the other, denoting them excessji for
all i and j. The correlation between excessji− excessij is an indication of the
total degree of reciprocity corrected for average grades. That statistic amounts
to 0.4356, indicating less-than-perfect reciprocity. Finally, while the country-
pair average of excessji − excessij is statistically indistinguishable from zero
(necessarily so), the standard deviation is rather large, namely 1.2847.
Table 1 shows the excess-scores excessij and excessji for 10 dyads with the
highest excess-scores, the 10 dyads with the lowest excess-scores and a couple
of dyads that are interesting for other reasons. In all the cases shown, the
countries have met at least 10 times in the competition and all excess-scores
are significantly different from zero. 6 For example, the first line of the table
is to be read as follows. Cyprus (CYP) has been awarded by Greece (GRC)
a score 7.382 points higher than the average score that Cyprus receives in
an average year. In turn, Cyprus reciprocates by grades 8.754 points higher
than average. The lower region of the table illustrates some cases with rather
low reciprocity. For example, Finland is awarded by Italy average scores 0.806
points lower than its average, but gives grades that exceed Italy’s average by
3.324 points. Somewhat surprising, but in line with the literature, immigrant
stocks are not systematically correlated to grading behavior. For example,
6The full results are available at request.
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Table 1
ESC scores: Selected deviations from means
Country i Country j excessij std. err. excessji std. err.
CYP GRC 7.382 (0.059) 8.754 (0.048)
DNK ISL 3.655 (0.090) 2.276 (0.051)
ISL SWE 3.056 (0.051) 1.584 (0.091)
HRV MLT 2.852 (0.067) 3.445 (0.083)
CYP YUG 2.685 (0.061) 2.775 (0.075)
ESP GRC 2.648 (0.066) 1.902 (0.058)
TUR YUG 2.456 (0.025) 3.587 (0.074)
DNK NOR 2.341 (0.076) 0.714 (0.055)
DNK SWE 2.130 (0.073) 3.275 (0.093)
ITA YUG 1.927 (0.103) -1.476 (0.076)
NOR SWE 1.792 (0.058) 2.799 (0.089)
ESP ITA 1.704 (0.074) 3.254 (0.094)
GBR HRV 1.589 (0.091) -1.511 (0.069)
FIN ISL 1.297 (0.021) -1.339 (0.050)
AUT TUR 1.197 (0.048) -0.236 (0.041)
BEL FRA 1.130 (0.055) -0.500 (0.093)
ISR YUG 0.822 (0.089) 2.327 (0.072)
GRC ISR 0.642 (0.060) -2.027 (0.096)
AUT GER -0.239 (0.045) -0.690 (0.088)
GER TUR -0.617 (0.082) 2.013 (0.038)
CHE ISR -0.719 (0.085) 2.006 (0.095)
FIN ITA -0.806 (0.041) 3.324 (0.093)
GRC TUR -1.018 (0.053) -0.337 (0.039)
CHE ESP -1.744 (0.077) 1.581 (0.066)
FRA TUR -1.810 (0.082) 1.036 (0.039)
GBR ISL -2.022 (0.093) 0.800 (0.053)
CYP TUR -2.099 (0.051) -1.348 (0.042)
DNK YUG -2.284 (0.071) 1.481 (0.078)
Pair specific intercepts, means adjusted.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Austria is awarded an excess-score of 1.197 by Turkey, but grants lower than
average points to Turkey. The opposite is true for the pair Germany-Turkey,
with a similar immigration pattern. Finally, table 1 also provides evidence
for a Nordic club (involving Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, but not Fin-
land), and a Mediterranean club (involving Cyprus, Greece, Croatia, Malta,
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Spain, but not Turkey). These results
are consistent with recent findings of Fenn et al. (2006).
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The variables scoreji and scoreij exhibit substantial time variance. The coef-
ficient of variation computed separately for 507 country pairs 7 takes a maxi-
mum value of 4.79 for Belgian grading of Finn songs, and a minimum of 0.20
for Cypriot grading of Greece songs. The average coefficient of variation is 1.41
with a standard deviation of 0.55. Not surprisingly, there is a strong degree of
negative correlation between the coefficient of variation and excess scores.
3.2 ESC scores as a measure of cultural proximity
Before we turn to a comparison of the ESC scores to other measures of cul-
tural proximity, we have to deal with two major problems that make ESC
scores noisy indicators. First, the organization of the song contest follows a
strict set of rules. If there is a total of N nations competing, a given grading
country must fully exploit each of the 10 available non-zero grades. The re-
maining N − 11 countries all receive the score of zero. Hence, if two countries
face the same high cultural proximity to the grading country, they cannot
be allocated the same score, and if two countries face different but low cul-
tural proximity to the grading country, they will be allocated identical scores
(namely zeros) nevertheless. The larger N, the more inaccurate the index, as
more countries have to receive zeros in spite of (possibly) different degrees of
cultural proximity with the grading country. We have no reason to assume
that this measurement error is systematically correlated to the true cultural
proximity between two countries. Hence, while our our empirical results will
suffer from attenuation bias, they are nevertheless consistent.
Second, the ESC scores reflect not only cultural proximity. They are also
affected by the quality of the artistic performance. This implies that the ESC
scores have to be adjusted for measurable quality differences before they can be
used to measure cultural proximity. It is notoriously difficult to find objective
criteria for the quality of a song, but ex post measures of popularity may help.
7Here, we account for the direction of the relationship
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We construct the following indicator of song quality. We count how many
documents google.com finds in the world wide web on a given combination of
the artist’s name and the title of his/her song. 8 We adjust this web count
by accounting for the number of internet connections and per capita income
in the artist’s home country, and whether the artist’s country uses the Latin
alphabet or not. 9 The specification is as follows:
Scoreijt = ζ0 + ζ1Sit + ζ2Sijt + νt + uijt, (7)
where Scoreijt measures the number of points that country i allocates to
country j at date t. Sit is a vector of song-specific characteristics while Sijt
measures whether the song was performed in the language of country j. We
account for the changing number of participants at the ESC by introducing a
non-parametric time trend νt.
Since ESC scores are censored at zero, we estimate a zero-inflated negative
binomial model. The methodology and the estimation results are presented in
Table 8 in the Appendix. We use the residuals obtained in these regressions
to construct a variable Aijt = uˆijt. This variable is meant to measure the non
quality-related part of country j′s vote on country i′s performance.
Taking into account the censored part of the data, we are able to explain 9% of
the variance in outcomes by objective song-related criteria, such as the ex-post
success of a song or the language used. Ginsbourgh and Noury (2004) arrive
at qualitatively similar results, although they include an important additional
regressor, lagged ESC scores, which drives up the share of explained variance
to about 30%.
There is a rich body of literature on the role of cultural proximity for inter-
8Ginsburgh (2005) also computes an ex-post measure of song quality. He uses the
sum of points that a country receives in a given year from all partner countries. The
problem with this measure in our context is that it reflects cultural proximity: A
country receiving a high aggregate score enjoys a high degree of cultural proximity
to the grader countries.
9The reason for including this latter variable is that our search strategy under-
weights websites using the Cyrillic alphabet.
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national transactions. Widely used proxies for cultural proximity are common
language (a binary variable), linguistic proximity (a continuous variable), com-
mon past (e.g., colonial ties), common religious beliefs, common legal origins,
etc. A common language dummy is present in most gravity-type regressions
with bilateral trade, foreign direct investment, labor mobility, or aid as the
dependent variable (Alesina and Dollar, 2002; Rose, 2004).
Linguists have come up with continuous measures of linguistic proximity,
which take into account that some languages may have common origins, while
they are not identical, see Dyen et al. (2002). This measure has been used
in Ginsburgh (2005). While the Dyen database are available only for indo-
European languages, they contain more provide a more detailed measure of
linguistic proximity than the common language dummy. The index ranges be-
tween zero and one, where countries with an almost identical linguistic texture
(e.g., Austria and Germany) obtain the value of one. Note that the index takes
into account the existence of minority languages or distinct dialects, so that
the Dyen measure for UK-Ireland is close to unity (0.83) but not perfectly
so. Within the family of indo-European languages, France-Greece receives the
lowest measure, while pairs that involve countries from the indo-European
and another linguistic family (in our case, the Finno-ugric family), receive the
value of zero.
Some studies have controlled for cultural proximity by including a dummy that
takes the value of one if two countries share the same majoritarian religion.
We construct a more subtle indicator of bilateral religious similarity, based to
the one constructed in Alesina et al. (2003). Since our sample is basically lim-
ited to Europe (with the exception of Israel), we use the shares of Catholics,
Protestants, orthodox Christians, Muslims, Jews, atheists, and non-religious
persons in total population, drawn from mid-1990ies Census data. 10 Denoting
the share of adherents to religion r in country i by sri, we compute a bilateral
10The data are freely available on www.worldchristiandatabase.org and coincide
closely with entries in the CIA fact book and other sources.
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index ρij = 100 × ∑r srisrj, with ρij ∈ [0, 100] . This measure is meant to
capture common values, beliefs and traditions. It reaches a maximum value
of 85.43 for the dyad Poland-Malta, two fervently catholic countries, and is
minimum, 0.012, for the pair Poland-Turkey, which features strong but differ-
ent majoritarian religions. Typical European pairs have values such as 10.11
(UK-France) or 58.39 (Austria-Italy). We assume that our measure of religious
proximity, derived for the mid 90ies, is representative for the whole time span
covered by our exercise (that is, 1975-2003).
Finally, cultural proximity has been identified with the existence of similar
governmental and jurisdictional traditions. La Porta et al. (1999) construct
a measure that they refer to as common legal origin. They distinguish be-
tween English, French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist origins. Using
their data, we construct a dummy that takes the value of one if two countries
share the same legal origin and the value of zero otherwise.
All these measures have in common that they are either entirely time-invariant,
such as legal origin or linguistic distance, or move very slowly over time with-
out clearly discernible patterns, such as religious proximity. Moreover, those
measures have in common that they are symmetric, e.g., ρij = ρji, much the
same as geographical distance. And they usually turn out as highly relevant
determinants of bilateral trade volumes.
Table 2 shows that the the conventional measures of cultural proximity dis-
cussed above, correlate with the raw and the adjusted ESC scores.
Comfortingly, all measures of correlation shown in table 2 are positive and dif-
ferent from zero with p-values very close to zero. This shows that the quality
adjusted scores still correlate strongly with the unadjusted ones. Moreover, the
fact that ESC scores correlate tightly with standard measures of cultural prox-
imity used in the literature suggests that the scores are indeed good measures
of cultural proximity. The correlation with linguistic proximity is particularly
high (0.5914), while common legal origin exhibits a lower degree of correlation
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Table 2
Correlation matrix
Variable name Adjusted ESC-Score Linguistic Common Religious
ESC-Score Proximity Legal Origin Proximity
Adjusted ESC-Score 1.0000
(0.0000)
ESC-Score 0.4250 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Linguistic Proximity 0.5914 0.2428 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Common Legal Origin 0.1446 0.0885 0.1152 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Religious Proximity 0.3873 0.2032 0.2938 0.2167 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
The table shows R2 values obtained by regressing each variable against the other, one-by-one.
Within group correlation adjusted P-values of F-statistics in brackets. Number of observations
9, 493 except for correlations involving linguistic proximity (N = 3, 466).
with our and the other measure of cultural proximity. Table 2 fits nicely into
the picture drawn by Table 1, since the emergence of high ESC tends to occur
within country pairs that also exhibit a high degree of culutral proximity.
3.3 Summary statistics
Table 3 provides the summary statistics of our data. The source of our bilateral
trade data is the Direction of Trade Statistics (DoTS) provided by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and is measured in billion U.S. Dollars, data
on GDP comes from the Penn World Tables 6.0, and has been transformed
into billion U.S. Dollars. Our ESC data is drawn from the Facts&Figures page
at the official Eurovision website. The number of observations for most ob-
servations is 9,493 except for the Dyen measure which is available for 3,462
country pairs. 11
11The full STATA data set including codes and additional output is available from
the authors.
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Table 3
Summary statistics: N = 9, 493∗
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Source
Ln Exports 19.073 2.619 DoTS, IMF
Ln Imports 19.143 2.518 DoTS, IMF
ESC Score 2.886 3.747 http://eurovision.tv
Adjusted ESC Score 2.882 1.055 Own construction
Linguistic proximity 0.522 0.311 Dyen et al. (2002)
Common legal origin 0.181 0.385 La Porta et al. (1999)
Religious proximity 22.234 25.228 Own construction
ln Geographical distance 7.288 0.641 www.cepii.fr
Country i ln GDP 25.375 1.758 PWT 6.0
Country j ln GDP 25.388 1.749 PWT 6.0
Country i ln population 2.191 1.470 PWT 6.0
Country j ln population 2.203 1.464 PWT 6.0
Both in EU 0.160 0.367 http://europa.eu.int
Both in EFTA 0.063 0.244 http://www.efta.int
FTA with EU 0.049 0.215 http://europa.eu.int
FTA with EFTA 0.006 0.078 http://www.efta.int
Song in english 0.250 0.433 http://eurovision.tv
Song in multiple languages 0.041 0.199 http://eurovision.tv
Song in own language 0.835 0.371 http://eurovision.tv
Identical language 0.072 0.259 http://eurovision.tv
Repeated performance of singer 0.075 0.307 http://eurovision.tv
Ln google counts 6.640 0.808 Own construction
Cyrillic alphabet 0.124 0.329 CIA factbook
Per capita Internet 0.360 0.144 World Development
connections (2003) Indicators
∗ Except for linguistic distance, where N = 3, 462
3.4 Empirical Strategy
In order to derive the empirical specification, we must deal with two important
issues. First, the price index Pj in the market capacity term complicates the
estimation by introducing non-linearity in unknown parameters. Second, the
number, ni, of varieties produced in region i and the mill price, pi in the supply
capacity equation are not observable. We follow the established practice and
apply a comprehensive set of exporter and importer fixed effects to capture
unobservable origin and destination economic effects. 12 In particular, we set
12 See Hummels (1999), Redding and Venables (2004) and Combes et al. (2005), for
recent treatments of these issues.
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lnφit = α3 lnYit+νi and lnφjt = α4 lnYjt+νj, where Yit and Yjt are country i
′s
and country j′s real GDPs, respectively, and νi and νj summarize unobserved
country specific heterogeneity.
Log-linearizing the gravity equation (6), plugging in our trade cost specifi-
cation and our specification of cultural proximity, we obtain the following
equation:
lnXijt = α1 ln p¯iij + α2 lnΠijt + α3 lnYjt + α4 lnYit + α5 lnDij + α6Kijt
+ ν + νi + νj + νt + uijt, (8)
where ν ≡ lnM1−σ0 , νt ≡ gAt t, uijt = ln
(
σ−1ijt ε
σ−1
ijt
)
. α1 ≡ (1− σ) β1, α2 ≡
(σ − 1) β2, α5 ≡ (1− σ) δ, α6 ≡ (1− σ) .
We proxy α¯Aijt = α1 ln p¯iij + α2 lnΠijt, where Aijt is the adjusted ESC score.
When we run this regression (our specifications S1 or S3 in later tables), the
estimate ̂¯α reports the total effect of cultural proximity on bilateral trade flows,
combining thee the cost and the bilateral affinity channels. However, including
country-pair specific fixed effects νij ≡ α1 ln p¯iij (in specifications S2 and S4)
allows proper identification of the bilateral affinity effect α2. More generally,
the fixed effects νij control for all time-invariant characteristics of country
pairs, making any conventional measures of cultural and geographical distance
redundant. The time fixed effects take care of common time movements in
bilateral trade volumes, such as the world-wide business cycle. The effects of
GDP Yit and Yjt, trade policy Kijt and our time-variant measure of cultural
proximity Aijt are then solely identified by their time variation.
13
lnXijt = α2Aijt + α3 lnYjt + α4 lnYit + α6Kijt
+ ν + νi + νj + νij + νt + uijt (9)
Our estimate of the cost effect follows straightforwardly by computing α̂1 =
13 See Baltagi et al. (2003) for an example of a gravity equation that includes
country-pair fixed effects.
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̂¯α − α̂2. Note that the dependent variable in our regressions are either the
natural logarithm of exports or imports, where the latter specification offers a
natural way to check the validity of our instrumentation strategy, see below.
The variable Kijt will be proxied by a vector that contains information about
regional and free trade areas, including the European Union (EU), the Euro-
pean Free Trade Area (EFTA) and all bilateral trade agreements that involve
those entities and other countries. Since our sample includes only European
countries, this procedure seems appropriate. 14
Before interpreting the results, the specified model raises several econometric
issues. The quality-adjusted ESC score is derived using the estimated errors
of the ESC equation (7). Sampling errors carried over from the first-stage re-
gressions could lead to a slight over-estimation of the standard error of the es-
timated coefficient in the second-stage regression. We thus use bootstrap tech-
nique to estimate standard errors. Finally, we use the Huber-White method
to correct for heteroscedasticity. Since the data are pooled over years, we also
correct for serially correlated responses from pair of countries (Wooldridge,
2002). 15
4 Results
4.1 The impact of cultural proximity on trade
Our first goal is assess the importance of cultural similarity on bilateral trade.
We thus estimate a first model taking into account all measures of cultural
proximity. Since most variable are time constant, we run a set of OLS regres-
sions and account for within-dyad serial correlation of error terms and report
14 For example, the pre-accession treaties with East-European countries and Turkey,
and the special arrangements of the European Economic Association that establish
free trade between EFTA and EU, are accounted for in that vector.
15We have experimented with the unadjusted ESC scores with the conclusion that
our key findings do not depend on quality adjustment. However, quality adjustment
does lead to somewhat more precise estimates.
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adequately adjusted standard errors.
The estimated coefficients of first model are presented in Table 4. We report
four different specifications (S1) to (S4) including the adjusted ESC score in
the second and fourth specification. The first and the second specification deal
with the impact of cultural proximity on bilateral exports while the second
and the fourth deal with their impact on bilateral imports.
In all specifications, we add the logarithm of bilateral geographical distance,
the logarithm of each countries’ GDPs. We also control for the stance of trade
policy by adding two regional dummy variables. the first one takes the value
of one if the two trade partners are members of European Union (EU) and
zero otherwise. The second one takes the value of one if the two partners
are members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and zero otherwise.
We apply a comprehensive sets of exporter and importer dummy variables to
control unobserved economic variables, and a set of time dummy variables to
control for global business cycle.
Apart from the religion proximity, the measure of cultural proximity are always
statistically significant and of the expected signs. They have quantitatively
substantial effects, both in absolute terms and also relative to the effect of
geographical distance. We use the sample standard deviations of the variables
to quantify their impact on bilateral trade flows.
Table 4 shows that a one standard deviation increase in the adjusted ESC score
leads to 4.96 percent higher exports (0.0470×1.055) and to 3.17 percent higher
imports (0.0300× 1.055) . Increasing linguistic proximity by one standard de-
viation leads to 25.28 percent higher exports (0.813×0.311) and to 22.70 per-
cent higher imports (0.730× 0.311) 16 . Common legal origins boosts exports
by 10.01 percent (0.262×0.385) and imports by 9.51 percent (0.247×0.385).To
compare this with the effect of geographical distance, note that a one stan-
16Due to data availability, with linguistic proximity, the country sample is relatively
small.
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Table 4
Cultural proximity and trade
Variable Exports (lnXijt) Imports (lnXjit)
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4)
Distance -0.459*** -0.460*** -0.475*** -0.476***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13)
Domestic GDP 0.781*** 0.790*** 0.595*** 0.601***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11)
Partner’s GDP 0.674*** 0.669*** 0.743*** 0.740***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
EU Dummy 0.259*** 0.254*** 0.237*** 0.234***
(0.067) (0.066) (0.063) (0.064)
EFTA Dummmy 0.326** 0.329** 0.287** 0.289*
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15)
FTA with EU -0.234 -0.230 -0.219 -0.217
(0.23) (0.25) (0.21) (0.26)
FTA with EFTA 0.144 0.166 0.379 0.393
(0.31) (0.24) (0.45) (0.45)
Linguistic Proximity 0.828*** 0.813*** 0.740*** 0.730***
(0.24) (0.27) (0.23) (0.28)
Religious Proximity 0.0567 0.0650 0.108 0.113
(0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.25)
Common Legal Origin 0.262** 0.262** 0.247** 0.247**
(0.10) (0.12) (0.098) (0.12)
Adjusted ESC score (Aijt) 0.0470*** 0.0300***
(0.011) (0.011)
Exporters Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importers Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3462 3462 3462 3462
R-squared 94.00 94.00 94.00 94.00
Number of Clusters 176 176 176 176
Bootstrap Replications 1000 1000
Robust standard errors into parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors
in (S2) and (S4).
Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering within country pairs.
∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at one percent level
∗∗ denotes statistical significance at five percent level.
∗ denotes statistical significance at ten percent level.
dard deviation decrease in geographical distance (starting from the average
distance) leads to an increase in exports by 4.05 percent (0.460× 0.641/7.288)
and to a boost in imports by 4.19 percent (0.476× 0.641/7.288) .
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4.2 Disentangling the trade costs and preferences effects
We are now ready to exploit the two major advantages of the adjusted ESC
score variable, namely its time dimension and its asymmetry. Cultural prox-
imity of country i relative to country j, Πijt, has a constant and a time varying
component so that we may write it as Π¯ijΠ˜ijt. We make the following iden-
tifying assumption: only the time invariant component of Πijt, i.e. Π¯ijt, is
relevant for the effect of cultural proximity on trade costs and hence trade
volumes, while both the time variant and the time invariant part matter for
trade through the impact preferences. When we dummy out the time invariant
part Π¯ij, any remaining effect of cultural proximity on trade volumes must be
through preferences. The time variant dimension of the ESC score therefore
allows us to neatly identify the preferences effect.
The asymmetric nature of the ESC data, in turn, allows to check whether our
identification strategy is sensible or not. If we assume that corr
(
Π¯ij, Π¯ji
)
>
corr
(
Π˜ijt, Π˜jit
)
, we would expect that a significant preferences effect on ex-
ports Xjit need not be associated with a significant preferences effect on im-
ports Xijt. In the extreme case, where the time invariant part of cultural prox-
imity is symmetric and therefore perfectly correlated
(
Π¯ij = Π¯ji
)
, the ESC
score should matter for imports and exports alike through the costs chan-
nel. However, if corr
(
Π˜ijt, Π˜jit
)
is sufficiently low, Π˜ijt matters only for Xjit
through the preferences effect, but not for Xijt. That is, exports and imports
are affected asymmetrically.
Table 5 represents the estimates associated to the strategy discussed above.
Specifications (S1) and (S3) report the results of a regression of logarithm
of exports and imports respectively on the adjusted ESC score, domestic
and partner’s GDP, trade policy indicators, exporter-country and importer-
country dummies, as well as time dummies. In specifications (S2) and (S4),
we add dyadic-specific dummy variables. These dummies take care of all time-
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Table 5
Disentangling the cost and affinity channels. Introducing dyad-specific fixed effects.
Variable Exports (lnXijt) Imports (lnXjit)
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4)
Adjusted ESC score (Aijt) 0.0510*** 0.0217*** 0.0466*** 0.0121*
(0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.0071)
Distance -1.180*** -1.083***
(0.080) (0.080)
Domestic GDP 0.438*** 0.604*** 0.527*** 0.741***
(0.083) (0.071) (0.087) (0.068)
Partner’s GDP 0.562*** 0.696*** 0.380*** 0.477***
(0.078) (0.062) (0.083) (0.073)
EU Dummy 0.0163 0.246*** -0.005 0.227***
(0.080) (0.049) (0.080) (0.052)
EFTA Dummy 0.445*** 0.169*** 0.406*** 0.146*
(0.12) (0.051) (0.10) (0.066)
FTA with EU -0.262** -0.122** -0.200* -0.0893*
(0.11) (0.050) (0.11) (0.051)
FTA with EFTA -0.745*** -0.435*** -0.417** -0.141
(0.23) (0.12) (0.18) (0.17)
Exporters Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importers Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic Dummies No Yes No Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9493 9493 9493 9493
R-squared 90.00 97.00 90.00 97.00
Number of Clusters 958 958 958 958
Bootstrap Replications 1000 1000 1000 1000
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors have been
adjusted for clustering around the country pairs’ identity.
∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at one percent level
∗∗ denotes statistical significance at five percent level.
∗ denotes statistical significance at ten percent level.
invariant dyad-specific determinants of bilateral trade, including the cost-
relevant part of cultural proximity.
Our results can be interpreted as follows: The total effect of cultural proximity
on trade as proxied by the estimate ̂¯α on our adjusted ESC measure (columns
(S1) and (S3) in Table 5) is 0.0510 in the export equation and 0.0466 in the
import equation. These estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase
in the adjusted ESC measure boosts exports by 5.38 percent and imports by
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4.92 percent. Compared to these effects, a one standard deviation increase in
the geographical distance lowers exports by 10.38 percent and imports by 9.52
percent. 17 Turning to specifications (S2) and (S4), the existence of country-
pair fixed effects makes the inclusion allows the identification of the bilateral
affinity effect αˆ2. Those estimates turn out 0.0217 and 0.0121 for exports and
imports, respectively. This means that a one standard deviation increases in
cultural proximity boosts exports by 2.29 percent and imports by 1.28 percent
through the bilateral affinity effect. Accordingly, we find the effect of cultural
proximity operating through the cost channel as α̂1 = ̂¯α− α̂2 = 0.0293, which
implies that a one standard deviation increase in Aij boosts exports by 3.09
percent and imports by 3.64 percent. The other coefficients, in particular those
on GDP have the magnitudes and signs that are familiar from the literature.
One key observations relates to the asymmetry between exports and imports.
Here it is useful to recall that the adjusted ESC score measures how close cul-
turally the Importer country feels to the Exporter country. Exports (by the
exporter country) should be affected by that variable even after controlling for
the time-invariant components of cultural proximity. Imports (by the exporter
country) should be affected only to the extent that the ESC scores are recipro-
cal. The lack of reciprocity that we have discussed above explains the findings
that transpire from Table 4, namely that the adjusted ESC score boosts ex-
ports and imports in quantitatively similar fashion through through the cost
channel (3.09 versus 3.64 percent, respectively), but the bilateral affinity effect
is much smaller for imports (1.28 percent) than for exports (2.29), with only
marginal statistical significance (the P-value in the (S2) is 0.007, while it is
0.094 in (S4). This finding lends credibility to our identification strategy.
17Again the sample mean has been used to compute these numbers.
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4.3 Robustness checks
In this subsection, we provide two comments on endogeneity and measurement
error before evaluating the robustness of our results. First, we do not push our
findings as evidence that cultural proximity causes trade through the cost and
affinity channels. Claims on causal effects are always delicate. Second, in the
presence context, it is difficult to think about reverse causality. This is par-
ticularly true for the time-invariant part of cultural proximity. For example,
linguistic, ethnic or religious proximity, across European countries have been
shaped centuries ago through numerous military conflicts, ethnic cleansing
and the redrawing of borders. While this events may have been partly caused
and shaped by trade issues, this seems a remote possibility. Hence, we believe
that we can plausibly treat that component of cultural proximity as exoge-
nous to the determination of bilateral trade over 1975-2003. Besides these
considerations, our empirical strategy does not require assumptions of the
type E[νi, νijt] = 0 or E[νj, νijt] = 0 or E[νij, νijt] = 0. Hence, for consistent
estimation of the bilateral affinity effect α2, we need only E [∆νijt,∆Aijt] = 0.
We do not need that preferences are as such strictly exogenous (which is an
assumption that virtually the entire theoretical and empirical trade literature
makes). The weaker condition that changes in bilateral affinity are unrelated
to the changes in the error term is enough. 18
Turning to the time-variant part of cultural proximity, the above reasoning
is somewhat more difficult to push. Clearly, with endogenous preferences, one
could think about reverse causality running from trade to bilateral affinity.
Two points arise here: First, preferences are usually taken as exogenous in
18One may argue that the condition E [∆νijt,∆Aijt] = 0 may be violated due to
habit formation. In that context, higher imports in t − 1 would increase bilateral
affinity in t. In oder to capture this, we have included interaction terms between
the year and exporter/importer fixed effects (See Baltagi et al., 2003). This lowers
the degrees of freedom available, thus reducing the degree of precision of the es-
timates. However, our key results are not severely affected, neither quantitatively
nor qualitatively.
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most economic theory. Second, if we were willing to treat preferences as en-
dogenous, it is difficult to think about any variable that could be related to
swings in bilateral affinity and yet be uncorrelated to the error term in the
trade equation. For these reasons, we do not analyze the issue of endogeneity.
However, we have experimented with instrumenting the bilateral affinity vari-
able by its lags, or differences. The F-statistic of these first stage regressions
are very low. Second, ESC scores are noisy indicators of cultural proximity.
Therefore, our estimates may suffer from attenuation bias due to measurement
error. However, since this bias is negative, our estimates can be interpreted as
lower bounds to the true effects. As long as the aim of the analysis is to reject
the null of no evidence for the bilateral affinity effect, our results should hold
a fortiori if the measurement problems could be somehow solved.
Next, we conduct two robustness checks. The first deals with the question,
whether our results survive if the time dimension of the data is reduced. Dur-
ing short time horizons, the cost-relevant component of cultural proximity is
more likely to be constant than over a longer horizon, hence, our identifying
assumption is more likely to be met. We present the results in Table 6. Since
there is no variation of the EFTA dummy variable from 1975 to 1985, this
variable and the bilateral agreements that involves the EFTA are dropped
from the regression. The same applies for the EU dummy variable and the
bilateral agreements that involves the EU from 1996 to 2003.
The main results are in line with the baseline regressions of Table 5. Given
market sizes and bilateral trade costs, the adjusted ESC score has a statisti-
cally significant effect on export flows in all sub-periods, with some variation
in the degree of precision of the estimates and the range of the parameter es-
timates lying between 0.0181 and 0.0226 (Remember, the parameter estimate
was 0.0217 in Table 5). The effect of the adjusted ESC scores on bilateral
import flows remains positive, statistically insignificant, and up to a factor 3.2
smaller than the estimate for exports.
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Table 6
Short Time Span
Variable Exports (lnXijt) Imports (lnXjit)
(1975- (1986- (1996- (1975- (1986- (1996-
1985) 1995) 2003) 1985) 1995) 2003)
Adjusted ESC score (Aijt) 0.0181** 0.0134* 0.0226** 0.00839 0.00420 0.0108
(0.0089) (0.0075) (0.011) (0.0073) (0.0091) (0.010)
Domestic GDP 0.104 0.381*** 0.483*** 0.345*** 0.872*** 0.551***
(0.087) (0.098) (0.081) (0.088) (0.10) (0.096)
Partner’s GDP 0.226** 0.927*** 0.486*** 0.0570 0.124 0.395***
(0.100) (0.12) (0.085) (0.088) (0.082) (0.081)
EU Dummy 0.135 0.267*** 0.0933 0.284***
(0.089) (0.061) (0.074) (0.073)
EFTA Dummy -0.00798 -0.165***
(0.043) (0.044)
FTA with EU 0.0284 -0.108** -0.0629 -0.190** -0.0883 -0.0490
(0.087) (0.046) (0.060) (0.084) (0.065) (0.057)
FTA with EFTA -0.0993 0.0065
(0.14) (0.081)
Exporters Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importers Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2335 3548 3610 2335 3548 3610
R-squared 99.00 99.00 98.00 99.00 99.00 98.00
Number of Clusters 362 672 873 362 672 873
Bootstrap Replications 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering
around the country pairs’ identity.
∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at one percent level
∗∗ denotes statistical significance at five percent level.
∗ denotes statistical significance at ten percent level.
We have argued above that the trade-cost relevant component of cultural prox-
imity can be considered as roughly constant over the time. This assumption
is more difficult to maintain the longer the time horizon, as over the long-run
migration, etc., may well affect the relevant component of cultural proximity.
The results presented in 6 indicate that our identification strategy is valid also
over short time periods, so that they do not seem to be driven by variation in
that component of cultural proximity that we take as trade-cost relevant.
The second robustness check concerns the change of ESC rules from a jury-
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based decision making process to Televoting. The first 2 columns of Table (7)
are run over the time span 1998-2003, when Televoting was in force, the re-
maining columns use data from 1975-1997, when the decisions were taken by
juries. Note that there are neither enlargement of the EU or the EFTA nor bi-
lateral agreements that involves the EFTA over 1998 to 2003. The EU dummy
variable, the EFTA dummy variable and the FTA*EFTA dummy variable re-
main thus constant in the televoting sample and are perfectly collinear with
the exporters and importers dummy variables.
Table 7
Televoting versus Jury Decision
Variable Televoting Jury Decision
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Adjusted ESC score 0.0310** 0.0136 0.0335*** 0.0151**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.0072) (0.0076)
Domestic GDP 0.209*** 0.378*** 0.471*** 0.756***
(0.075) (0.10) (0.087) (0.075)
Partner’s GDP 0.205* 0.158* 0.717*** 0.360***
(0.11) (0.089) (0.079) (0.084)
EU Dummy 0.287*** 0.276***
(0.050) (0.051)
EFTA Dummy 0.113** 0.0365
(0.055) (0.074)
FTA with EU -0.109* -0.0753 -0.113 -0.126*
(0.059) (0.056) (0.072) (0.068)
FTA with EFTA -0.327** -0.198**
(0.13) (0.090)
Exporters Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importers Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2324 2324 7169 7169
R-squared 98.00 98.00 98.00 98.00
Number of Clusters 733 733 784 784
Bootstrap Replications 1000 1000 1000 1000
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors have been adjusted
for clustering around the country pairs’ identity.
∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at one percent level
∗∗ denotes statistical significance at five percent level.
∗ denotes statistical significance at ten percent level.
The results are in line with the baseline regressions of Table 5. Irrespective of
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the ESC rules, our measure of bilateral affinity has a positive and significant
effect on bilateral exports, while it has a positive and insignificant effect on
bilateral imports in the televoting sample. It is almost insignificant in the
jury decision sample. These results are in line with Haan et al. (2005), who
argue that the transition from a jury-based voting system to televoting has
not triggered large changes in the way how song- or country-specific factors
determine the ESC scores.
5 Conclusions
Standard measures of cultural proximity, such as common language, common
religion, etc., do not allow to disentangle the channels through which bilat-
eral trade volumes are affected: namely, trade costs and preferences. We argue
that quality-adjusted Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) scores can be used as
dyadic, time-variant information on European countries’ cultural proximity.
Since the trade-cost related component of cultural proximity is largely time-
invariant, the time dimension of the ESC data allows to separately identify the
preferences effect. The validity of our identification strategy can be tested by
exploiting the lack of systematic reciprocity in ESC scores. While we find ro-
bust evidence for a sizable preferences effect, the impact of cultural proximity
on trade runs largely through the cost effect.
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Appendix
The Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) distribution is a mixture dis-
tribution assigning a mass of p to excess-zeros and a mass of (1 − p) to a
negative binomial distribution, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Note that the negative bi-
nomial distribution is a continuous mixture of Poisson distributions, which
allows the Poisson mean λ to be gamma distributed. More specifically, the
negative binomial distribution is given by
Pr(Y = y) =
Γ(y + τ)
yΓ(τ)
(
τ
λ+ τ
)τ ( λ
λ+ τ
)y
, (10)
where λ = E(Y ), τ is a shape parameter which quantifies the amount of over-
dispersion. In the present context, Y is the ESC scores. The variance of Y is
λ+ λ2/2. A negative binomial distribution approaches a Poisson distribution
when τ tends to ∞ (no over-dispersion). A ZINB distribution arises as a
mixture of a negative binomial and a distribution censored at zero, and is
given by equation (11)
Pr(Y = y) =)= p+ (1− p)(1 + λ/τ)−τ, if y = 0 (11)
= (1− p)Γ(y + τ)
yΓ(τ)
(1 + λ/τ)−τ(1 + τ/λ)− y, if y > 0
The mean and variance of the ZINB distribution are E(Y ) = (1 − p) and
var(Y ) = (1 − p)λ(1 + pλ + λ = τ), respectively. Observe that this distrib-
ution approaches the Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) and the negative binomial
distribution (NB) as τ tends to ∞ and p tends to zero, respectively. We use
a Likelihood Ratio test and find that the ZINB is preferable to the ZIP. The
Vuong test clearly reject the NB model.
Finally, we use the Huber-White method to correct for heteroscedasticity.
Since the data are pooled over years, we also correct for serially correlated
responses from pair of countries (Wooldridge, 2002).
The first set of coefficients reported in Table 8 is related to the negative
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Table 8
Adjusting the ESC scores
Variable Name Negative Zero % change % change
Binomial Part Inflated Part Inflated Part Zero-Inflated Part
Google Counts 0.110∗∗∗ -0.456∗∗∗ 11.7 -36.6
(0.011) (0.035)
Internet 0.000 0.000∗∗ -0.0 -0.0
(0.000) (0.000)
GDP 0.012 -0.126∗∗∗ 1.2 -11.8
(0.014) (0.031)
Population -0.006 0.068∗ -0.6 7.0
(0.017) (0.041)
Cyrillic alphabet 0.047 -0.383∗∗∗ 4.8 -31.8
(0.045) (0.098)
Song in English 0.098∗∗∗ -1.076∗∗∗ 10.3 -65.9
(0.027) (0.089)
Song in multiple languages -0.025 -1.176∗∗∗ -2.4 -69.2
(0.066) (0.159)
Song in own language -0.115∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗ -10.9 -34.9
(0.048) (0.107)
Song in language of grader
country
0.087∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ 9.1 -20.2
(0.051) (0.136)
Repeated performance of
singer
0.071∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ 7.4 -13.0
(0.026) (0.069)
Time dummy YES YES
Trend YES YES
Number of obs. 10582
Nonzero obs. 5195
Zero obs. 5387
LR test (ZIP vs. ZINB) 1522.20***
Vuong test (ZINB vs. NB) z=30.55***
McFadden’s Adj R2: 0.021
Maximum Likelihood R2: 0.092
Robust standard errors into parentheses. Standard errors have been adjusted
for clustering around the country pairs’ identity.
∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at one percent level
∗∗ denotes statistical significance at five percent level.
∗ denotes statistical significance at ten percent level.
binomial part of the equation predicting that the points are from the “Not
Always Zero” group. These show that the Google counts, a song in English
language or in the language of the grader country, or the repeated performance
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of singer increases the number of points that a country gives to a partner while
a song in its own language decreases it. The second set of coefficients is related
to the zero-inflated part of the equation predicting that the points are from
the “Always Zero” group. These can be interpreted as logit coefficients. They
predict zeros, so that their sign will usually be the opposite to that of the
former coefficients.
The two-last columns present the percentage change of the ESC-Score with
respect to a change in the song specific variables. A one percent increase in
“Google count” increases the ESC score by 11.7%. A song written in English
increases it by 10% while a song written in its own language reduces the score
by 10.9%.
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